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The international community has committed itself to the goal of human development1 and 
more concretely to the empowerment of women. Empowerment of women is defined as 
‘improving their ability to access the constituents of development - in particular health, 
education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation’ (Duflo, 2005). In this 
thesis I concentrate on the empowerment of women in terms of the improvement of their 
earning opportunities.  
My research questions are:  
Which constraints limit women’s earning opportunities in developing countries? And can the 
United Nations and the World Bank’s strategies overcome these constraints? 
In order to shed light on the mechanisms that may create conflicts between improved earning 
opportunities for women and economic growth, I use a structuralist model by Blecker and 
Seguino (2002). This model permits us to recognise the mobility of firms as the main 
constraint to realise an optimistic scenario in which the conflict between higher wages and 
economic growth is overcome. The mobility of firms and the bargaining power it possesses 
will press workers’ wages down to their reservation wages.  
Furthermore, I use a model of monopsonic labour market, in which the firm is able to pay the 
marginal unit of labour beneath its productivity, to show that the low female wages can be 
due to other factors than productivity. Monopsony power allows the firm to engage in wage 
discrimination and pay workers their reservation wages. The pressure on wages is 
experienced by both women and men, but women are most affected because of their lower 
reservation wages. I revise the sources to the lower reservation wages of women.  
The analysis makes clear that the mobility of capital and asymmetries in the distribution of 
power between employers and suppliers in the labour market power in developing countries 
call for international regulation and action rather than country-specific policies. With this in 
mind, I revise the recommendations made by the United Nations’ Beijing Declaration and the 
                                                 
1 In this paper, Human Development is defined as the process of enlarging people's choices. In this concept of 
human development economic growth plays a role in enlarging people choices, but development is more that 
the raise of income (UNDP, 1990). Gender equality and the empowerment of women are prerequisites to 
development (UN, 1995).  
 
 
strategic documents from the World Bank and evaluate them in terms of their potential to 
improve women’s earning opportunities. 
I conclude that both the Beijing Declaration and the strategic papers from the World Bank fail 
to address the constraints that limit women’s earnings opportunities stemming from the 
mobility of capital across borders and the monopsony power that the firms may possess in the 
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The international community has committed itself to the goal of human development2 and 
more concretely to the empowerment of women. Empowerment of women is defined as 
‘improving their ability to access the constituents of development - in particular health, 
education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation’ (Duflo, 2005). In this 
thesis I concentrate on the empowerment of women in terms of the improvement of their 
earning opportunities.  
My research questions are:  
Which constraints limit women’s earning opportunities in developing countries? And can the 
United Nations and the World Bank’s strategies overcome these constraints? 
The motivation for these questions is to evaluate if the international organisations’ strategies 
are capable of improving the earning opportunities of women. I seek to answer these 
questions because, as pointed by Stephanie Seguino and other authors (see e.g. Berik et al. 
2011), there may exist a set of conditions under which an attempt to increase women’s wages 
will prevent economic growth. This is a challenging scenario for the international 
organisations when /if they aim for the empowerment of women, defined by their ability to 
increase their earnings, and economic growth.3 It is important for the international community 
to understand the mechanisms that generate this conflict in order to create strategies able to 
overcome such contradictions. 
This paper seeks to 1) clarify the mechanisms that generate the conflict between higher wages 
and economic growth because it may constrain women’s earning opportunities and 2) assess 
the United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Development Program and the World 
Bank’s strategies to achieve gender empowerment of women by their potential to relax the 
constraints that limit women’s earnings opportunities in developing countries.  
                                                 
2 In this paper, Human Development is defined as the process of enlarging people's choices. In this concept of 
human development economic growth plays a role in enlarging people choices, but development is more that 
the raise of income (UNDP, 1990). Gender equality and the empowerment of women are prerequisites to 
development (UN, 1995).  
3 A usual way to advocate for the empowerment of women has been by referring to its positive correlation to 
economic growth. The causal relationship between them has not been clearly defined World Bank (2001)). 
However, the analysis of this paper focuses primarily on the effect of empowerment of women in general and 
higher wages in particular, on economic growth. This is not to justify gender equality as a means to economic 
growth but a merely methodological approach to my topic. 
 
 
In order to shed light on the mechanisms that may create conflicts between improved earning 
opportunities for women and economic growth, I use a structuralist model by Blecker and 
Seguino (2002). This model permits us to recognise the mobility of firms as the main 
constraint to realise an optimistic scenario in which the conflict between higher wages and 
economic growth is overcome. The mobility of firms and the bargaining power it possesses 
will press workers’ wages down to their reservation wages.  
Furthermore, I use a model of monopsonic labour market, in which the firm is able to pay the 
marginal unit of labour beneath its productivity, to show that the low female wages can be 
due to other factors than productivity. Monopsony power allows the firm to engage in wage 
discrimination and pay workers their reservation wages. The pressure on wages is 
experienced by both women and men, but women are most affected because of their lower 
reservation wages. I revise the sources to the lower reservation wages of women.  
The analysis makes clear that the mobility of capital and asymmetries in the distribution of 
power between employers and suppliers in the labour market power in developing countries 
call for international regulation and action rather than country-specific policies. With this in 
mind, I revise the recommendations made by the United Nations’ Beijing Declaration and the 
strategic documents from the World Bank and evaluate them in terms of their potential to 




2 Earning opportunities vs. economic growth  
As mentioned in the introduction there may exist a set of conditions under which an attempt 
to increase women’s wages will prevent economic growth. This conflict could potentially 
limit the earning opportunities of women if economic growth was to be prioritised. The 
scenario that Seguino and other authors (see e.g. Seguino, 2006; Berik et al., 2011) refer to 
describe the working environment of women in mobile firms. Mobile firms have, in this 
context, two distinctive characteristics: 1) They are engage in the production in export-
oriented goods; 2) they have low sunk cost. Low sunk costs are due to labour intensive 
production processes that only require low skilled workers. This kind of firms is usually 
found in countries at early stages of industrialisation and thereby the economy depends on 
foreign capital to produce.  
The argumentation that gender equality could prevent economic growth hinges on the premise 
that women are concentrated in the mobile firms. Throughout this thesis, empowerment of 
women (i.e. improved earning opportunities) is operationalised as the reduction of the 
unadjusted gender earning differentials i.e. differences in the average earnings of women and 
men. Another important assumption is that all other wages of the economy are given and kept 
constant, and therefore, the only viable way to reduce the unadjusted gender earning 
differentials is by increasing the wages in female-dominated occupations i.e. the mobile firms. 
This chapter aims to clarify the economic mechanisms that create the conflict between higher 
female wages and economic growth in the specific context of mobile firms. I first revise the 
mechanisms that link wages to productivity, product prices and other production factor prices 
in light of standard economic theory assuming competitive markets. Later in this chapter, the 
context in which our analyses finds place is described in depth. Towards the end of the 
chapter, a structuralist model by Blecker and Seguino (2002) and its results are presented. 
This model formalises the case of a trade off between higher wages and output in a context 






2.1 Effect of higher wages  
There are two mechanisms though which an increase in wages levels can reduce national 
income.4 These mechanisms are demand and investment. We consider first a fall in the 
product demand. In the standard analysis framework, workers’ wages are determined by their 
marginal productivity. A representative firm’s profits-maximisation problem yields (with the 
classical assumptions) that in optimum, the marginal revenue (i.e. price) should equal 
marginal cost for the last unit being produced. If wages increase while the prices of other 
inputs and productivity remain constant, the costs of production increase as well. 
For a firm producing for a competitive market, the price of the commodities is given. In this 
case, the increment marginal costs will lead to a reduction in the amount being produced and, 
by consequence, a fall in the demand for labour. In the case that the producer has some market 
power in the goods market and can, therefore, influence the price of the good, the constraint 
on wages imposed by the optimisation criteria dictating marginal revenue equal to marginal 
cost for the last unit being produced is still valid. In this case (monopoly or oligopoly), the 
producer has to take account for the price elasticity of demand since he/she will be facing a 
falling demand curve for the good. The prices will be as a mark-up of the marginal cost.  
We can conclude that, either in the competitive or monopoly case, higher prices of labour 
relative to the other factors of production without an increase in productivity will result in a 
fall of demand for the good and consequently for the labour used in its production. 
The second mechanism works through the investment channel. Investment will be affected in 
two ways. First of all, in the case the firm can influence the good price,  a higher wage 
increases the unit cost and reduces demand. The reduction of demand will have consequences 
for the revenues of the firms and their ability to carry out future investments. And secondly, 
higher costs of production reduce the firm’s profits. In this way, higher wages erode the 
firms’ incentives to invest.  
Again, we can consider the competitive scenario with exogenous prices as well as the case in 
which the firm owns some market power and faces a falling product demand. In either case, 
as long as the good prices are above the marginal costs, the firm has the opportunity to 
‘internalise’ an increment in wages in order to prevent product demand from falling. The 
                                                 
4 Throughout this chapter, I (following Seguino) consider a simple national income definition and disregard 
government spending. 
 Y= Consume + Investment + (Export –Imports).  
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internalisation of a wage increase will reduce the profits of the firm and the firm’s incentives 
to invest.  
The conclusion is that an increase in wages will affect investments (negatively) in that 
industry. The fall in investment is as result of a fall in profits, this fall is a consequence of a 
reduction in product demand, a shrinking of the difference between product price and 
marginal cost or a combination of both.  
These mechanisms (reduction in demand and investments) described above are valid 
independently of other characteristics of the firm, e.g. the level of skills required in the 
production process, of the market it produces for (domestic or international).  
Better earning opportunities for women (i.e. higher wages in the mobile firms) can work 
against economic growth, as Seguino claims, due to the mechanisms we highlighted above 
together with other context-specific features of developing countries at early stages of 
industrialisation. In the next paragraphs, we look closer at four characteristics specific to 
developing countries at early stages of industrialisation: emphasis in export manufacturing, 
dependence of foreign capital to produce, production taking  place within mobile industries, 
and finally, the majority of the workforce in these industries being women (Kabeer, 2004; 
Fontana&van der Meulen Rodgers, 2005; Seguino&Grown, 2006a).  
 
2.2 The context  
The conclusion that higher female wages dampens economic growth is the analytic 
consequence of the context we are focusing on. We therefore need to look closer at the 
characteristic features of developing countries at early stages of industrialisation.   
International trade and the export sector.  
The effects of international trade on women’s earnings are much revised in economic 
empirical literature (World Bank, 2001). At the theoretical level, a basic model as the 
Heckscher–Ohlin (see e.g. Feenstra, 2004) yields the conclusion that trade expands the 
consumption opportunities of a country. The model also predicts an increase in the demand 
for the factor of production which is relative abundant in this country. The increase of demand 
 
 
for the abundant factor of production creates winners and losers within the country, but trade 
benefits the county as a whole. According to this model and its analysis, workers in labour 
abundant countries (as is the case in developing countries) will gain also relative to the 
owners of capital.  We will then expect then that both female and male workers benefit from 
trade.  
The most promising empirical counterpart of this theoretical link has been the ‘East- Asian 
miracle5’ even though the Asian crisis in 1997 slowed down these economies. East Asia with 
Japan and the so-called four Asian tigers, draw a path for economic development that many 
other countries have intended to reconstruct and follow (World Bank, 2001:207). From the 
mid- nineteen sixties to 1990, these East Asian economies experienced the highest growth 
rates in the world. An increasing share of exports on their national accounts combined with 
the appropriate macroeconomic policies played a central role in their growth strategy (ibid).  
This theoretical link has been embraced by the World Trade Organisation which firmly states 
that ‘trade can lead to economic growth and development’ (WTO, 2011). The World Trade 
Organisation works to integrate developing countries in the multilateral trading system (ibid).  
The status of international trade as an important part of a growth strategy was also reinforced 
by the structural adjustment policies undertaken by several developing countries from the late 
1970’s and early 1980. These structural reforms aimed at bringing national demand in line 
with national product plus external financing in order to reverse or respond to external 
economic shocks (ibid, p. 213). A key feature of the structural adjustment policies was the 
deregulation of trade and the reduction of regulatory constraints to savings and investments – 
making it easier to move capital internationally (ibid). 
Increased importance of the export sector in the structure of developing economies is usually 
linked to the process of globalisation (see e.g. Seguino & Grown, 2006a; Seguino, 2003; 
Fontana & Van Der Meulen Rodgers, 2005) observed towards the end of the 20th century. In 
our context, globalisation can be reduced to the aspects of  international trade and investment 
liberalisation. The first has given developing countries the option to follow an export-led 
growth strategy while the second facilitates inward and outward movement of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that allow developing countries to industrialise.  
                                                 
5 Stiglitz refer to: Japan, The four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan),  




According to economic theory, international trade and the liberalisation of capital would yield 
gains for workers, especially for low skilled workers because they are abundant in developing 
countries. The remaining question is under which conditions international trade and 
liberalisation of capital can constrain the earning opportunities of women. The majority of 
low skilled workers are most often women. The remaining of this chapter and chapters 4 and 
5 elaborate on the answer to this question. The answer to it consists of two parts. 
 First, as  mention above, female workers are concentrated in jobs in mobile firms 
characterised by low sunk cost, due to the labour intensive character of the production process 
and the low level of skills required in this industry. These firms are engaged in the production 
of goods for export. When products are going to be sold to remote market the firms are 
mobile not just because they have low costs, but also because the firms do not have to be 
located in the producing country to facilitate sales (Seguino 2003). The deregulation of capital 
provides even more mobility to the firms in question. If there are not cost attached to the 
movement of capital from one country to another, the  only cost the firms have to consider  to 
reallocate production are the sunk costs linked to physical capital left behind.  This mobility 
of the firms creates an asymmetry in bargaining power between the suppliers of labour and 
employers, and it is this asymmetry of power that constrains women’s earnings. Another 
source of power asymmetry is a disproportionate amount of suppliers of labour relative to 
buyers of labour. i.e. employer. The extreme case is the theoretical case of monopsony, in 
which there is just one firm in the labour market. The mobility of firms and monopsony 
power allow firms to push wages downwards.  
There is also a second reason why trade and liberalisation of capital create an environment 
that limits the earning opportunities of women. This second reason is related to the economic 
link between economic growth and higher wages. Economic growth emerges from increments 
in productivity. The increment in productivity makes it possible to increase wages without 
altering the unit cost of the commodity.  In the competitive case, wages are reflective of the 
marginal productivity of workers. What is problematic in the context we analyse in this paper 
is the firms’ ability to press wages down. Low wages combined with the firms’ capability to 
reallocate in the case that higher wage levels are imposed on them (e.g. by minimum wage 
regulations) annihilates their incentives to increase productivity. The result is that the jobs in 
such industries do not enhance economic growth of the economy, but they function as 
 
 
‘subsistence jobs’.  Seguino (2003) calls it a ‘low wage low productivity trap’. If female 
labour is concentrated in these subsistence jobs, their earning opportunities are limited.  
This last paragraph highlights the importance of the remaining defining features of the context 
we are analysing in order to understand the conditions that create a conflict between higher 
wages and output. This is important to us because such a conflict could potentially limit the 
earnings opportunity of women if economic growth was to be prioritised. 
 
Mobility of capital  
 Mobility of capital is one defining feature of the context in which higher female wages could 
prevent economic growth. The de-regularisation of capital movements relaxes the dependence 
of investment on own savings and allows developing countries without saving capacity to 
start the process of industrialisation. Seguino (2003:15)  points out that developing countries 
at early stages of industrialisation are likely to depend on foreign capital to produce the goods 
they intend to trade in the international market.   
It is important to distinguish between direct and financial foreign investment. In this paper we 
focus in the first one, foreign direct investment (FDI) which is less volatile than the second 
one. However, low sunk costs and the low level of skills required in the production processes 
in which women are usually involved give the firms a large capacity to move out of the 
country. It is this capacity to move to other locations that have provided firms with the 
‘threat’ effect and allow firms to put a downward pressure on workers (both female and male) 
(Seguino, 2003; UNCTAD, 2010).  In the previous section, we derived the negative effect of 
an increment in wages under the assumption that the prices of other inputs remained constant 
and that there is no higher productivity. The firms have of course the alternative to alter the 
ratio of production factors in their production process. With labour becoming relatively more 
expensive than capital, the firm has the option of either investing in human capital to increase 
productivity per worker or to invest in physical capital that substitutes labour. Seguino 
(Seguino, 2003) remarks that the mobility capacity of firms in the export sector annihilates 




An important remark on the mobility of the firms is that, in this paper, the term ‘mobile firms’ 
refers to international firms that face low sunk costs which allow them to easily move 
production to other locations. The term covers Seguino’s ‘mobile industries’ (FDI with low 
sunk cost, including training costs), but also includes other ‘mobile’ arrangements of 
production as subcontracting or domestic outwork. A multinational firm buying input or final 
products from local subcontractors can be regarded as an international investor with 
extremely low sunk costs.  We cannot disregard such mobile arrangements of production 
because, as Braunstein (2000) points out, there is a prevalence of subcontracting and domestic 
outwork in the export oriented sector. The activities of subcontractors and single workers are 
often connected to single multinational companies (ibid).  
Segregation  
The reasoning that higher women wages can be counterproductive to economic growth, 
hinges upon the observation that women are overrepresented in the export sector. Fontana & 
Van Der Meulen Rodgers (2005) also point out that they are women who usually take jobs of 
casual, temporary and flexible nature, and that women are often involved in subcontracting 
arrangements with final-goods producers. By this form of production, larger firms reduce 
costs by producing outside of costly labour regulations. Such regulations can stipulate certain 
benefits and worker's right to organise by avoiding these (ibid).   
The World Bank’s 2001 report, for instance, explains that the occupational segregation is 
persistent in both developed and developing countries. Women are underrepresented in the 
better-paid and formal sector jobs and overrepresented in the unpaid and informal sectors, 
according to the same report (World Bank, 2001). In particular, it is reported that women 
constitute the vast majority of labour force in the garment sector worldwide (ibid: 54). 
 
Gender gaps /low wages 
In this section I seek to further clarify what is meant by improved earning opportunities. 
According Seguino& Grown (2006a), the type of job that women usually take is an important 
part of the explanation for their low wages, as they work in ‘mobile’ industries.  Low wages 
are, as standard economics suggests, the expression of the low skill level needed in the 
 
 
production process but there is also the possibility that, if women are segregate to sectors 
where the firms have a high degree of power in the labour market then they can be receiving 
lower wages due to other factors in addition to their lack of skills. Throughout this chapter we 
assume that wages are competitive (the wage of the marginal unit of labour is equal to the 
marginal productivity). In the next chapters, the assumption that wages reflects the marginal 
productivity of workers is challenged.  
Occupational segregation and gender earning gaps are two of the most common expressions 
of gender inequality (World Bank 2001). However, there is a need for further clarification of 
concepts and ways of measure gender inequality in the labour market. This is important 
because the way we understand – and measure- gender inequality will determine the 
challenges we the international organisations seek to overcome.  
The WB reports that globally women earn less than men. It is documented that, from a sample 
of 71 countries, on average, the unadjusted female to male earnings ratio on developed 
countries is 77 percent (gender pay gap 23 %). While in developing countries women earn 73 
percent of men (World Bank, 2001:55).  Tzannatos(1999) gives a rough indication of 
women’s earnings relative to men’s and states that women’s earnings increased from two 
thirds to three-quarters of men’s wage income in the first years of the 1980’s in industrialised 
countries. These figures are not distant from the ones reported by Aumayr et al. (2010).They 
report an unadjusted gender pay gap of 17.6% for the 27 European Union member states and 
Norway based on data from 2007. Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) conducted a 
meta-analysis of the international gender wage gap and arrived at the conclusion that during 
the 1990’s the raw gender wage differential was  30 %.  These numbers are valuable in the 
sense that they point in the same direction and place the unadjusted female to male earnings 
ratio in a rather short interval (70-83 %).  
The relevance of focusing on the unadjusted gender wage gap when dealing with gender 
inequality has been challenged. If we limit our understanding of gender inequality to equal 
pay for equal job and at the same workplace or within the same industry, analysing the 
unadjusted wage gap can be misleading in several ways (World Bank 2001). First, the average 
earnings when not adjusted for the attributes of workers, such as education, work experience 
and skills training are in reality comparing earnings across different types of workers. Second, 
wages reflect differences in occupations, so when women, as mentioned above, concentrate in 
some occupations the gender gap will reflect this feature and should not be interpreted as 
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gender discrimination. And finally, the World Bank indicates that the unadjusted gender gap 
disregards the fact that women work less paid-hours than men.   
Rubery et al. (2005) explains that adjusting the gender wage gap presumes that, except for 
gender discrimination, wage structures will reflect market factors or productivity differences. 
(The determinants explain the differences in people, inter-industrial differences and 
institutional differences). Aumayr et al. (2010) do the following categorisation of gender 
wage determinants:  
1. Job, company and workplace characteristics  
2. Type of contract and working hours 
3. Personal characteristics 
4. Job history 
5. Contextual variables, such as region 
6. Institutional variables 
Critics to the ‘decomposing’ approach point out that while studying the determinants of 
earnings differences provide useful insights, the focus should not be on the adjusted wage gap 
for analysing gender inequality (equality in earning opportunities). Aumayr et al. (2010) 
highlights two weakness of this way of addressing gender earning gaps. First of all, the 
unexplained component is, in traditional gender wage gap econometric specifications, 
supposed to be captured by the residual term of the equation.  The residual also contains other 
unobservable and unknown variables. In practice, there is the possibility that omitted 
productivity-related variables as effort or commitment lead us to overestimate the 
discrimination (Rubery et al. 2005). Secondly, Aumayr et al. (2010) underline that the 
explained determinants of the gender wage gap can also be the result of discriminatory 
processes.  
While the first remark can be confined to the methodological level, the second is also a 
criticism of the understanding of gender equality that such decomposition suggests. (It might 
legitimate the view that the adjusted gap is the only part of the pay gap that is discriminatory- 
unequal).  
In this section, we have established that there is a gender wage gap which can be decomposed 
into an adjusted and unadjusted (the residual) part.  The unadjusted gender wage gap relies on 
 
 
the concept of gender equality of earning opportunities and is therefore compatible with the 
aspect of the empowerment of women that we are concerned with. 
 
2.3 A structuralist model 
In this section, I present the formalisation of the argument that higher wages can jeopardise 
economic growth. I do this by  using a model presented in Blecker and Seguino’s paper 
‘Macroeconomic Effects of Reducing Gender Wage Inequality in an Export-oriented, Semi 
industrialised Economy’ (Blecker & Seguino, 2002). I present the model in order to 
understand the mechanisms that create and ‘optimistic’ case in which the conflict between 
higher wages and economic growth. This conflict could constrain the improvement of 
women’s earning opportunities if economic growth was to be prioritised ahead of the 
empowerment of women.  
 The model I chose to use among the two presented in that paper, analyses the comparative 
static effects of a reduction due to an exogenous increase in women’s wages, while men’s 
wages are keep constant. I chose this model in order to disregard the possibility of a 
devaluation that would allow for an increase of female wages while holding the prices to 
international consumers unchanged.6 I present only a shorter version. 
The appealing feature of this formalisation is that it frames the parameters corresponding to 
the parts of the discussion I want to focus on. The model seeks to replicate some of the 
conditions describing an export-oriented economy, which production possibilities depend of 
foreign investment, and female workers are concentrated in the export-sector.  
Seguino & Grown (2006a) underline that in countries in early stages of industrialisation, the 
labour-intensive export industries, in which the majority of workers are women, tent to be the 
more mobile. The assumption of full segregation means that, in practice, a reduction of the 
gender wage gap is equivalent to higher wages in the export sector i.e. mobile firms.    
In particular, they include a parameter on the mobility of capital. In addition to derive the 
negative effects of a higher wages for women in the export-sector, the model deducts a set of 
                                                 
 4. The second model presented in that paper the female-male wage ratio as well as  the real exchange rate are 
endogenous variables of the model, while it assumes flexible nominal wages and a crawling-peg exchange rate.  
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scenarios and thinkable outcomes of an exogenous increase in women’s wages under each of 
them:  The ‘pessimistic’, the ‘cooperative/ optimistic’ and finally what they call the 
‘equalising but conflictive’ case.   
In chapter three, we look at the conditions  required to reproduce a ‘optimistic’ scenario, 
which will allow the organisations to advocate for empowerment of female’s workers rights 
that will lead to higher wages without undermining economic growth.  
The model consists of a stylised characterisation of a two- sector economy, producing a non-
tradable home product 𝐻 and an export- good X that is consumed both at home and in the 
international market. The H- sector employs male labour 𝑎𝐻 for a male -specific wage 𝑤𝑚. 
The export-sector utilises female labour 𝑎𝑥  at wage 𝑤𝑓 to produce the good to be sold at the 
international market  (𝑋).  Male wages are assumed to be higher than female wages, i.e. 
𝑤𝑥 >  𝑤𝑓. The model also assumes complete gender segregation. In our case, this assumption 
is to say that wages in the export sector i.e. the mobile sector are low compare with other 
wages in the country.   
In addition to labour, the economy produces with help of an imported capital input 𝑛 which 
world price is 𝑃𝑛∗ , the non-tradable home sector uses 𝑛𝐻 of the imported capital good, and the 
export-sector utilises 𝑛𝑋 in its production. In her analysis, Blecker and Seguino model the 
dependency of semi-industrialised economies in foreign capital by assuming that the country 
needs to buy capital from abroad. This is conceptually the same as saying that the country 
seeks to attract and retain mobile firms to operate in the country. The term mobile firms, in 
this paper, refers to foreign direct investment into industries with low sunk cost as well as 
international firms involved in sub-contracting arrangements with local suppliers.  
The model derives the following mark-up price equation for the export sector:  
𝑃𝑋 = 𝜙� 𝑤𝑓𝑎𝑋 + 𝑒𝑃𝑛∗𝑛𝑥� ,                   𝜙 > 1     (1) (𝑒 ) is the exchange rate, so that  𝑒𝑃𝑛∗ is the price of the capital input in domestic currency.  
The export- sector mark-up 𝜙 can be either constant or flexible, in particular Seguino and 
Blecker impose the following functional form: 
∅ =  Φ𝜌𝑋𝜃            (2) 
 
 
Where  𝜌 =  𝑒𝑃𝑋∗ 𝑃𝑋�  is the real exchange rate for exports 𝜃  ≥0 is the elasticity of the price-
cost margin with respect to 𝜌, a high 𝜃 shows that a firm has the ability (willingness) to 
internalise an increase in production cost in response to international competitive pressures.  
When 𝜃 > 0  the firms mark-up adjust instantaneously to try to maintain its market share 𝜃 
which in this model is exogenous. Combining (1) and (2) we can write: 
𝜙 =  Φ1 (1+𝜃)� 𝑒𝑃𝑋∗(𝑤𝑓𝑎𝑋+𝑒𝑃𝑋∗𝑛𝑋 )𝜃 (1+𝜃)� ,             Φ > 1     (3) 
This last expression makes it clearer that when 𝜃 ≠ 0 the mark-up 𝜙 is more sensitive to 
variations in production costs. In our analysis 𝜃 reflects the ability or willingness of a firm to 
internalise an increase in wages as a function of its ability to move production to other 
locations and, if it is the case that the firm has some monopsony power in the labour market, 
𝜃  will reflect the firm’s powerful position.  
In this model, the primary macroeconomic effects of any increase in female wages are on 
export demand as well as investment in export industries. To see this, consider the following 
two expressions:  
𝐸𝑋 = 𝐴 �𝑒𝑃𝑋∗𝑃𝑋 �Ψ ,      𝐴 > 0,      0 <  Ψ < ∞               (4) 
𝐸𝑋 is the export demand, 𝐴 is an exogenous shift factor ( such as income levels in foreign 
countries. A decrease in 𝐴 would, for example, represent a recession in foreign economies),  
𝑃𝑋
∗ is the foreign currency price of competing products from other countries, and Ψ is the 
price elasticity of demand.   
The investment function used by Blecker and Seguino states investment expenditures as a 
function of profits in the two sectors in the following way: 
𝑒𝑃𝐼
∗𝐼𝑀+𝑃𝐻𝐼𝐻 = 𝐼0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝐻 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑋  ,             𝑏1,𝑏2 > 0           (5) 
 𝐼𝑀 is the economy’s import of investment goods  and 𝑃𝐼∗ is its price in foreign currency.  
Then  𝑒𝑃𝐼∗𝐼𝑀  is, in our interpretation, the value of foreign direct investment to the country. 
𝑃𝐻𝐼𝐻 is domestic investment.  Together is the left hand side the total investment expenditures 
in both sectors, the model do not specify in which sector the investments are done.   
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The right-hand side is the investment demand function. Blecker and Seguino define 𝐼0 as a 
constant term that is meant to reflect a minimum level of investment in the country. The 
parameters 𝑏1 and 𝑏2measure the reponsivennes of investment to profits in the two sectors. 
The authors elaborate and explains that   𝑏2 reflects the openness of a country to inflows and 
outflows of ‘footloose capital’; it expresses that investment in any particular  developing 
country will depend on  the relative profitability  of its export-sector  compared with that of  
any other competing country.  If mobile firms, including firms buying inputs of final products 
from subcontractors, perceive their profits to be reduced (by and increment in wages) they 
move to other locations.  
𝑅𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑋 are the profits received in each sector, in particular :  
𝑅𝑋 = (𝜙 − 1)�𝑤𝑓𝑎𝑋 + 𝑒𝑃𝑛∗𝑛𝑋�𝑋 ,    𝜙 > 1         (6) 
Where X  is the total demand for the X-good.  
 𝑋 = 𝐶𝑥 +  𝐸𝑥          (7) 
𝐶𝑥 is the home consumption of the X good.  
In order to integrate the value of  imported investment goods ( FDI )  𝑒𝑃𝐼∗𝐼𝑀 into  the  
equilibrium condition for overall goods market- clearing,7  the authors conveniently assume 
that imported investment goods are a fixed proportion ( 𝜇 > 0) of home investment,  such  
that 𝐼𝑀 = 𝜇𝐼𝐻 , and  
𝑃𝐻𝐼𝐻 = [𝐼0 + 𝑏1𝑅𝐻 + 𝑏2𝑅𝑋] /(𝜌𝑀𝜇 + 1)   (5a) 
From the above expression it becomes clear that the effects on exports (demand) and 
investments are due to the alterations of the real exchange rate for exports 𝜌𝑋 = 𝑒𝑃𝑋∗𝑃𝑋   through 
the increase of 𝑃𝑋 . 𝐸𝑋 in (4) decreases affecting the total demand of the good 𝑋 , 𝑅𝑋 in (6) 
decreases as well and finally the investment level (5a) falls. The decrease in demand for the X 
product is due to a decrease in exports, but also the decrease in home demand for the 𝑋-
product. The relative price of home good to the export-good 𝑃𝐻 𝑃𝑋 �  decreases and a reduction 
on the home demand for the 𝑋-product will follow.  These results are similar to those we got 
                                                 
7 Equation (19) of the original model 
 
 
in our analysis in section 2.1. The valuable contribution of Seguino and Blecker is that their 
model highlights that the magnitude of the negative effects of a reduction in profits will 
depend on the mobility of the firm (𝑏2). The logic seems rather simple, if a mobile firm is 
able to move to another location, it will be more responsive to a marginal reduction of their 
profits. The reduction in investment can occur through a reduction of the mark-up 𝜙, due to a 
𝜃 > 0 or by a reduction in the quantity of the export good being demanded ( 𝑋 )in (6). 
The equilibrium condition stating that national income (Y) equals aggregate demand makes 
clear that a reduction in investment, domestic demand and export demand following an 
increase in women’s wages would reduce the former.  Nominal national income, which for 
simplicity assumes no government spending or taxation, is divided between total wages  
𝑊 =  wH + wX and 𝑅 = 𝑅𝐻 + 𝑅𝑋. 
𝑌 = 𝑊 + 𝑅 =  𝑃𝐻𝐶𝐻 + 𝑃𝑋𝐶𝑋 + 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝐻 + 𝑃𝑋𝐸𝑋 − 𝑒𝑃𝑛∗(𝑛𝐻𝐻 + 𝑛𝑋𝑋) (7) 
The explanation in words is that female workers are concentrate to the production X-good 
which is mainly produced for export. The production process requires low levels of skills and 
they are labour intensive processes. This type of production processes yield low sunk cost to 
the firm and great mobility. And increase in the wages will lead to an increase in prices 
𝑃𝑋 and a decrease in the real exchange for exports  𝜌𝑋 = 𝑒𝑃𝑋∗𝑃𝑋   . From this, it follows a 
reduction in demand for 𝑋 as well as a reduction of investment levels. I.e. foreign capital 
moves to other locations and/or international clients find final goods suppliers in other 
countries. 
 By assuming some local consumption of the X-good, the authors explore the option that a 
decrease in export demand can to some extent be outweighed by an increment of the home 
demand. In our exposition, the parameter 𝛼 refers to the share of national income that is spent 
on the export-product X. The mechanism will work through the income redistribution from 
the owners of capital to workers. This redistribution stems from firms’ ability to internalise an 
increment in wages through 𝜃. This redistribution is beneficial to the economy because 
workers are assumed to have higher propensities to consume than the owners of 
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capital ( 𝑐𝑊 ≫  𝑐𝑅). 8 Seguino (2003) explains that higher wages can influence the economy 
positively because they would create incentives for the firms to increase productivity.   
2.3.1 Results of the model  
As mentioned above, in her analysis Blecker and Seguino identify three possible outcomes of 
an exogenous increase in women’s wages:  The ‘pessimistic’, the ‘cooperative/ optimistic’ 
and finally the ‘equalizing but conflictive’ case.  These are scenarios which all include an 
increase of the export-good prices 𝑃𝑋 and a reduction (of different magnitudes) in export 
demand and investment.   
Which scenario will prevail, will depend on the values of the parameters of the model. In 
addition to the parameters presented above: 1) price elasticity of demand ( Ψ ),  2) 𝑏2, which 
measures the responsiveness of investment to profits in the two sectors  and 3) 𝜃  representing 
the elasticity of the price-cost margin with respect to the real exchange rate for exports 𝜌𝑋 
with (𝜃 ≥ 0), the original model also includes the following parameters:  
𝑐𝑤, 𝑐𝑅 :  Marginal propensities to consume out of wage (𝑤) and profit (𝑅)  income (1 ≥ 𝑐𝑤 > 𝑐𝑅≥0, and  
𝛼:  Share of national income that is spent on the X-good 
The ‘pessimistic’ case comes around if 1) the exports markets are highly competitive (high 
Ψ), 2) there is little home consumption of the 𝑋-good (𝛼 is low), 3) if the spending 
propensities of workers and capitalists 𝑐𝑤, 𝑐𝑅 are similar so that a redistribution of national 
income  Y = W + R does not have a big impact on domestic demand and 4) if the remaining 
parameters, 𝜃 and 𝑏2, are either both high or low at the same time.  
This combination of parameter seems logic when we look at expression (2). From (2) it 
follows that a high 𝜃 (meaning that firms cannot pass higher production costs on to 
consumers) will lead to a reduction of the firms’ profits (∅). This combined with high capital 
mobility 𝑏2 (which allows reallocating production to lower cost locations) will strengthen the 
negative effects of an exogenous increase in women’s wages on the production of the X sector 
via investment (5a). The combination of a low 𝜃 and low 𝑏2 will mean that an increase in 
factor prices will be almost entirely transmitted to consumers (low 𝜃)  and that demand for the 
                                                 
8  The model assumes 1 ≥ 𝑐𝑤 >  𝑐𝑅 ≥ 0,  
 
 
X-good will be sharply reduced due to the high price elasticity (Ψ) in this case, the firm will 
close their operations.  
The model yields the conclusion that  a rise in women’s wage  under such circumstances 
causes a relatively large loss of export so that female employment definitely goes down, while 
the effects on total employment, 𝑎𝑋𝑋 + 𝑎𝐻𝐻 , and the real income 𝑌 𝑃𝐻� are ambiguous.  
The ‘cooperative/ optimistic’ outcome or the ‘equalizing but conflictive’ to be realised, it is 
required that 𝜃 is high and the mobility of capital is limited (low 𝑏2). In addition, there is a 
significant difference between workers and owners of capital propensities to consume 𝑐𝑊 ≫ 𝑐𝑅. The parameters that determinates whether the outcome is cooperative or conflictive are 
the price-elasticity the 𝑋 -good demand (Ψ)and the share of national income that is spent on 
the X-good (𝛼). 
In the first case is Ψ > 1 but only moderate, while in the second it is less than one Ψ < 1. The 
major contrast between the two cases is regarding the share of income spent on the x-good. 
While the optimistic case will depend on a low 𝛼, the conflictive one is realised by a high 𝛼.  
In the optimistic case, women’s gains take the form of higher wages, but no more jobs ( since 
𝛼 is low, the increase in domestic consumption does not outweigh the loses in export 
demand), while men get more jobs due to the boost effect of aggregate demand from the 
redistribution from profits to wages 𝑐𝑊 ≫  𝑐𝑅. In the conflictive case, women gain in terms of 
higher wages and more jobs, while the number of jobs in the H-sector might increase or 
decrease. Men’s real wages fall since all workers have the same propensity to consume the X-
good, which price has increased. That women benefit while men do not is the reason to call 
this last outcome for conflictive.  
I will consider the optimistic and conflictive outcomes equally desirable, in the sense that they 
get around the trade off between higher wages or employment faced by women in developing 
countries. This trade-off has been used as an argument for holding back demands for 






3 The optimistic case  
3.1  The optimistic case, what is needed? 
In this chapter we revise the optimistic case, in which the conflict between higher wages in 
the mobile industries and economic growth is avoided.  
Seguino and Blecker (2002) conclude in their analysis that the impact of a reduction in the 
gender wage gap will have negative repercussions for the economy and that the magnitude of 
these negative consequences will depend on the parameters of the model. In the next section, 
we look at the conditions required to reproduce the ‘optimistic’9 scenario. This is important 
out of two reasons.  (1) We have implicitly assumed that it is a goal to increase the wages of 
women, and 2) It is necessary in order to evaluate the World Bank’s and United Nations’ 
ability to improve women’s earnings opportunities. We will use the optimistic scenario as a 
benchmark case. I will especially concentrate on the mobility of the firm (b2) and the 
willingness or ability of the firm to internalise an increment in wages that will reduce its 
profits ( 𝜃 ) 
The model considers:  
1. The price elasticity of demand ( Ψ ), 
2. The firms’ ability to internalise an increase in wages in the mobile industries 𝜃, 
3. Marginal propensities to consume out of wage (𝑤) and profit (𝑅)  income, 𝑐𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑅 , 
with 1 ≥ 𝑐𝑤 >  𝑐𝑅 ≥ 0. 
4. The fraction of national income spend on good 𝑋 ( 𝛼),   
5. The mobility ( 𝑏2) of the firm. It measures the responsiveness of investment to profits 
in the mobile industry because it reflects the openness of a country to inflows and 
outflows of  what Blecker and Seguino call  ‘footloose’ capital  
6.  
The optimistic case required:  
( 𝜃) to be high, the mobility of capital to be limited (low 𝑏2), a significant difference between 
workers and owners of capital propensities to consume 𝑐𝑊 ≫  𝑐𝑅, the price-elasticity of 
demand for the export product  (Ψ) should be either less than one or moderate higher than 
                                                 
9( case II and III which I call for optimistic) 
 
 
one and the share of national income that is spend on X (𝛼) could actually be either low or 
high. 
Since we do not have restrictions on the value of (𝛼), we can simply ignore it. As I mentioned 
above I will concentrate on the 𝜃 and 𝑏2 for several reasons. First, both the elasticity of 
demand and the propensity to consume are descriptive parameters, which the international 
organisations cannot influence. Second;  the propensity to consume differences between 
workers (𝑐𝑊) and capitalist (𝑐𝑅 ) is part of the demand side of Seguino and Blecker’s model 
(the reduction on export demand is compensated by an increase in the domestic demand (𝛼) 
and the workers demand ( 𝑐𝑊 ≫  𝑐𝑅 )). The emphasis on the positive effects of redistribution 
depends upon the understanding of  growth as being wage-led rather than  profit-led. 
Seguino’s proposal to overcome the contradiction between wages increment in the export 
sector and economic growth is to seek the ‘set of structural, policy and institutional conditions 
in which a redistribution to wages from profits is a stimulus to growth’ (Seguino & Grown, 
2006a).  The approach that growth can be wage-led hinges upon the idea that higher wages 
could stimulate productivity growth, and neutralise the effect of an increase in wages on unit 
labour cost and prices and thereby neutralise the effects on investment and export demand. 
For this reasoning to be accurate, there are two conditions to be met. One is that workers are 
able to harvest the fruits of productivity gains, which is not necessary always the case. And 
second, that that firms have incentives to increment productivity. Both conditions will 
depend, among other factors, on  𝜃 and 𝑏2. That is why I prioritise these parameters. I come 
back to the explanation on how 𝜃 and 𝑏2 influence workers’ compensation and firms 
incentives to increment productivity of their workers.   
The reason for disregarding the elasticity of demand is closely related to Seguino and 
Grown’s (2006a) recommendation to shift production to price-inelastic good and services in 
order to be able to combine the goals of improving women’s well-being and promoting 
economic growth. The explanation consists of two parts. One is that the decision on what sort 
of good to produce may be outside of the developing countries set of options, if they depend 
on international capital to produce at all at early stages of industrialisation. For more mature 
economies (as the East Asian ‘tigers’)  with manufacturing production shifting towards more 
skill-intensive (and less price inelastic) goods, the share of female workers in manufacturing 
has fallen (Seguino & Grown, 2006a). An explanation to this can be that even if the gender 
education gap is narrowing many places, the firms continue to regard women as less 
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profitable investments for training, partly because they are less stable workers due to family 
duties and  partly because of the perception that women’s income is just a secondary source of 
income to households. However, firms’ decision on whether to invest in female or male 
workers is subsequent to the decision on whether to invest in training or not. This first 
decision depends again – among other factor- on  𝜃 and 𝑏2. Next, I revise how mobility 
influences the effects of an increment on wages in the mobile export sector, and how 𝜃 is 
influenced by 𝑏2. 
According to the analysis of the model, the negative effects of an increment in wages in the 
export sector would be bigger if the firms are able to change location (b2 is big) and less if the 
mobility of the firm is limited. Seguino & Blecker do not present an explicit relation of  𝜃 
and 𝑏2 and treat them as exogenous parameters. It should also be possible to consider the 
firm’s willingness or ability to internalise an increment in wages and reduce profits as a 
function of the mobility of the firms and other variables (v), i.e. 𝜃 = 𝑓(𝑏2,𝑣 ) . A firm with 
low sunk cost (or acquiring goods from local suppliers) will easily move to a new location if 
by that it avoids to reduce its profits.  
3.2 Mobility’s threat effect  
As mention in chapter two, the term ‘mobile firms’ refers to companies in the export oriented 
sector that have been established through foreign direct investment.  These firms have 
industries low sunk costs, including training cost and the amount of capital needed in the 
production process ( labour-intensive industries). Low sunk costs allow firms to easily move 
production to other locations. The term also includes companies  who utilise other ‘mobile’ 
arrangements of production, such as subcontracting or domestic outwork.  
Few regulations on inflows and outflows of capital in developing countries make firms much 
less physically bounded to a country as it increases the firm’s ability to respond to higher 
costs or more regulation by shifting production to less costly or regulated countries (Seguino, 
2003). Subcontracting on the other hand, makes local firms in the competitive export- sector 
to depend on more powerful clients further up the value chain Rubery & Grimshaw ( 2009) 
Seguino & Grown (2006a) points out that the mobility of firms requires developing countries 
interested in attracting FDI to compete with other countries in terms of, among other 
conditions, labour costs. Since we consider subcontracting as a mobile firm with very low 
sunk cost, this remark is valid for FDI with low sunk cost and local subcontractors aiming to 
 
 
attract multinational companies. Oostendoorp (2004) remarks that the mobility of firms, 
through increasing competition, may weaken the bargaining power of workers employed in a 
sector increasingly competing on the basis of ‘cheap labour’ (ibid, p.2). The increased ability 
of businesses to relocate at least some parts of their production across national borders puts a 
downward pressure on the wages in the relevant industry, he explains. 
Seguino & Grown (2006a) and Oostendoorp (ibid) refer to the ‘threat effect’ that firms’ 
mobility create. They explain the threat effect in terms of bargaining power differences 
between firms (acting as employers and clients) and workers/local suppliers. The basic 
bargaining model for determination of wages (see e.g. the exposition in Cahuc & Zylberberg 
2004) does not assume wages to reflect the marginal productivity of workers as we have 
assumed in this chapter. The bargaining model relaies upon the existence of a reservation 
wage that the worker has to get in order to participate in the non-cooperative game of wage 
setting. 
 The concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is a concept of equilibrium that successfully 
removes strategies based in non-credible threats. A simple game as the ultimatum can be 
instructive. In the ultimatum game, two players (the firm and the worker in our case) will 
negotiate how to divide a surplus. Player 1 proposes a way to divide it and player 2 responds 
by accepting it or rejecting it. If player 2 rejects, none of the two players will receive 
anything. In this game, there is just one subgame perfect equilibrium which yields that the 
player making the first offer will harvest the entire surplus generated by the game. This is 
because player 2 prefers to get some gains rather than nothing. The equilibrium is that player 
1 suggests to get all the surplus himself and player 2 is indifferent between accepting or not, 
meaning that the worker in our case is satisfied with getting his/her reservation wage. In our 
context it will mean that the mobile firm (who is the one offering a wage) gains all the 
difference between product price and the reservation wage of the worker because the workers 
have no way to threaten the firm. If the worker rejects, the firm can move to another place and 
find a new worker who will accept.  Reservation wages do not need to depend on productivity 
but cannot be higher than the competitive wage. In that case, the company would reduce 
labour demand. However, wages resulting from a bargaining process can be lower than the 
competitive wage. The lower the reservation wage of the worker, the bigger the gain of the 
firm. In this case, the firm will have an incentive to bargain against workers with the lower 
reservation wages for a given productivity.  
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 A firm’s mobility diminishes the incentives it has to invest in human capital in order to 
improve productivity that will compensate the increase in wages. The low levels of skills 
required in the production processes mean that the cost of training and turnover are low. 
Women are engaged in labour intensive activities, which means that sunk costs incurred by 
changing location are also low and that the firms do not invest in physical capital in order to 
influence the relative prices of production factors. Seguino (2003) remarks that firms can rely 
on low wages as a way to gain competitiveness and are not pressured to raise productivity. 
She describes this situation as a ‘low wage - low productivity’ trap characterised by low 
wages and slow improvements in productivity. This trap will hamper economic growth as 
investments in human capital are not carried out.  
We have now revised the parameters of the model and, in this context, identified the mobility 
(𝑏2) of firms as the most influential parameter on the effects of an increase in wages in the 
export-sector. The analysis of Seguino and Blecker leads to the conclusion that a transfer 
from profit income to wages (through a small b2 and a big 𝜃) reduces the ‘cost’ of higher 
wages for a given productivity. Higher wages would at the same time take the lead in 
inducing higher productivity in the labour-intensive manufacturing industries (Seguino, 
2003). This is what Seguino refers to as wage-led economic growth.  
Again, the reasoning that economic growth can be wage-led in the sense that it promotes 
productivity and therefore frees workers off a low wage, low productivity trap relies upon the 
assumption that workers (and the host country) are able to appropriate some of the gains of 
productivity, and that wages depend to a large extent on the skills of the workers. If this was 
not the case, the emphasis on education and other investments in human capital would not 
have been as strong as it is today. Bhattacharya and Rahman studied the garment industry in 
Bangladesh and found evidence that workers do not have the ability to harvest increases in 
productivity (in Seguino & Grown 2006a).  
The motivation to understand the constraints that limit women’s earning opportunities is to 
find ways to relax these constraints. Our second research question asks whether the 
international organisations’ strategies will be capable of overcoming such constraints.  
In chapter 6, we will evaluate the World Bank and United Nations recommendations aimed at 
promoting the empowerment of women (by improving their earning opportunities)  by 
 
 
looking at their potential to influence the mobility of firms (b2), which in this section was 
identified as the key parameter to reproduce the ‘optimistic’ case.  
An increment in wages (from which firms cannot escape) would give firms the incentives to 
invest in human capital to increase productivity, which will result on economic growth (i.e. 
the optimistic case in Seguino’s analysis). The regulation of capital movements has to be 
global in order to have a positive effect. Otherwise, the country imposing such restrictions on 











4 Monopsony power   
Monopsony describes a situation of a single employer encountering large amounts of 
suppliers of labour. In this chapter I present a basic monopsony model in order to explain how 
differences in labour market power may result in low wages relative to productivity. In 
addition I revise the implications of this model for the implementation of a minimum wage.  
4.1 Monopsony model 
Industries in the export sector in semi-industrialised countries are characterised by labour-
intensive production processes and the lowest sunk costs and are therefore the most mobile 
industries. Fontana & van der Meulen Rodgers ( 2005) and  Seguino & Grown, (2006a) state 
that female labour tend to be more concentrated in lower skilled jobs. These observations 
shape the impression that women in the early stages of industrialisation with a big export 
sector have jobs in the labour-intensive, low-skilled and mobile industries. A task to do is to 
review the  possibility that the mobile industries in the export sector have any source of power 
in the labour market that allow them to be paying their workers low wages not just on the 
basis of their low skills, but also as a result of the asymmetric power relation between 
employers and workers.  
The basic monopsony model10 is useful to shed light on the effects of labour market power on 
wages.  The basic model builds on two defining assumptions. First at all, the labour supply is 
confined to a restricted geographical area, and second, high entry costs restrict new firms to 
start production and demand labour. The first assumption is certainly applicable for low skills 
workers in developing countries which do not have easy access to labour markets in 
developed countries. The second one can be understood as weak competition at the local 
labour market by domestic industries due to adverse economic conditions in the country, 
scarcity of domestic capital and underdevelopment. This is consistent with the stylised facts 
of Seguino and Blecker’s model. In that model the import of capital is rigid to reflect the 
dependency of developing countries on foreign capital in order to produce.  
In the monopsony model, contrary to the common assumption of perfect competition, wages 
are not exogenous, and therefore there is not a mechanism that guarantees that workers are 
                                                 
10 Boal and Ransom take care of a more advanced model of monopsony power, as the case where there are 
several companies sharing market power.  
 
 
paid according to their marginal productivity. The monopsonic firm seeks to maximise its 
profits by deciding the wage to be paid to workers while facing a given upward labour supply 
function, so that the less the firm pays, the smaller number of workers it attracts (Rubery & 
Grimshaw, 2009). 
Formally:  𝐿𝑠(𝑤) = 𝐺(𝑤) is the labour supply function of the workers, (y) is the amount of 
product produced by one unit of labour. This one unit of labour is rewarded by  𝑤𝑀 in the 
monopsonic case in contrast to the w* that follows from the optimisation rule in the 
competitive case:  w* = y. 
The wage (𝑤𝑀) stems from the particular maximisation problem of the monopsonist  𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑤 𝜋(𝑤) = 𝐿𝑠(𝑤)(𝑦 − 𝑤)   ∗ 
The first order condition of the maximisation problem yields: 
   𝑤𝑀 = 𝜂𝑤𝐿 (𝑤𝑀)
1+𝜂𝑤
𝐿 (𝑤𝑀)𝑦,     ** 
 𝜂𝑤𝐿 (𝑤) is the elasticity of the labour supply and is strictly positive i.e.  𝜂𝑤𝐿 (𝑤) =  𝑤𝐿𝑠′(𝑤)𝐿𝑠′(𝑤  ≥ 0 
The profit of the firm11 is in this case expressed as:  𝜋 (𝑤𝑀) = 𝑦𝐿(𝑊𝑀)/[1 + 𝜂𝑤𝐿 (𝑤𝑀)] 
From (**) we see that the monopsony power, measured as   𝑦/𝑤𝑀 , gets  reduced with the 
elasticity of the labour. This is just an expression of the monopsonist’s trade off between 
offering low wages and the amount of labour  𝐿(𝑤𝑀) the firm can attract. If labour supply is 
highly elastic, a marginal reduction in wages means a steep fall in employment, production 
and profit. In the opposite case where the labour supply is less affected by wages, the 
monopsonist is able to reduce wages (or offer low wages) without noticing significant impacts 
on employment and thus on profit.    
Differentials in wages across groups of workers with the same competences and job 
specifications may exist if workers ‘are unlucky enough to be in a market dominated by a 
monopsony’ (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004:258). In terms of our analysis, low-skilled workers 
confined to developing countries will be receiving lower wages on the basis of their poverty 
levels (and lack of competition in labour markets) and not due to their lower productivity 
                                                 
11 We assume that the firms do not have any market power in the goods market, so that the prices for the 
goods are given.  
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compared to low-skilled workers in richer countries. They will also receive low wages with 
respect to high-skill workers in their own countries, if it is the case that higher-skills labour 
market is less monopsonic than the market for low-skilled workers.12  The differentials in 
wages (same skills level but different locations and same location but different skills levels) 
will be proportional to the weakness of the labour supply elasticity prevailing in their labour 
markets (ibid).  
Assuming that there is a ‘gender-less’ labour market13, women and men in a monopsonic 
labour market would be receiving lower wages relative to their productivity, but no wage 
differential would be observed within the single firm . Gender considerations can affect 
female workers’ wages in two ways: firstly, if there are gender differences of elasticity and 
secondly, if reservation wages differ across gender.  
Differences in labour supply elasticity affect, as we have shown above, the ratio  𝑦/𝑤𝑀  
which measures the monopsony power of the firm. Differences in reservation wages are 
relevant in the case that the firm is able to pay different wages for the same work (i.e if there 
is no regulation on equal pay for equal job). Wage discrimination is conceptually impossible 
under perfectly competitive labour markets since wages are paid according to their marginal 
productivity and workers are perfectly mobile. Wage discrimination across individuals or 
groups is linked to imperfect markets as in the case of monopsony.   
4.1.1 Wage discrimination 
Female labour is, as mention before, concentrated in mobile firms that could press wages 
downwards due to their powerful position in a monopsonic labour market. In this section, we 
will see that in such a market, it is possible to discriminate between different groups of 
workers. We revise the possibility that employers are able to pay women lower wages than 
they would pay men for the same level of productivity.   
Discrimination is defined as a situation in which identical productive individuals or groups 
are treated differently due to other non-productive characteristics (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 
2004). In his renowned analysis of discrimination, Gary Becker conceives it as originating 
from employers, workers’ and consumers’ preferences, among other variables.  Becker (1993) 
                                                 
12 Which can be the case if  the mobility of high skilled workers is greater than that of the low-skilled ones.  
13 We disregard all other dimensions by which equally productive humans can be grouped, for example etnicity 
or age.  
 
 
underlines that the only way to understand the barriers to the advancement of minorities is by 
widening the assumptions that employers only consider the productivity of their workers, that  
co-workers are indifferent to the characteristics of each other and that consumers exclusively 
care about qualities  of the goods and  services they buy. He points out that an employee may 
refuse to work under a woman or a black person even if they are well paid to do so, or that a 
customer may prefer not to deal with certain groups when receiving a service (ibid).  
In this form of interpretation, female workers14 must accept lower wages than other equally 
productive workers in order to compensate for the cost in terms of dislike that employers feel 
by employing them (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2004). The preferences of co-workers will also 
influence the wage that female workers get. Workers with an aversion for working with 
women have to be compensated by higher wages relative to their productivity. The high 
wages are financed by female wages which are lower than reflect their productivity (ibid). 
Following the same logic, female local contractors will receive lower prices than their male 
competitors to compensate international clients with an aversion.  
An alternative way to approach discrimination is along the argument that employers show an 
optimising behaviour by systematically employing women rather than men if women can be 
as productive as men. Lower levels of wages are then a result of women’s lower reservation 
wages and, if that is the case, women’s less responsive supply of labour to changes in wages 
(lower elasticity of labour than men).  
Boal & Ransom (1997) distinguish between first and third degree wage discrimination that a 
monopsonic firm can practice. Discrimination of the first degree assumes that the employer 
knows each worker’s reservation wage and pays only this wage to him or her. Boal & 
Ransom (ibid) remark that in practice, firms are more likely to at most have indicators of 
labour supply elasticities of different groups of workers.  If women and men have different 
elasticities, the firm can engage in third degree wage discrimination consistent with paying 
different wages for women and men. The group whose labour supply is more responsive to 
wages will receive higher wage  It should be possible for a monopsonist to combine both 
types of wages discrimination to increase its profits if there is reason to believe that women in 
general have lower reservation wages and lower elasticity of labour.  
                                                 
14 But also other belonging to the ”wrong” demographic group 
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Several studies have tried to establish the magnitude of women’s labour supply elasticity and 
whether it is higher or lower than that of men (Boal & Ransom, 1997). Empirical studies have 
usually found that women are more responsive to change in wages at aggregate levels (ibid). 
At the same time, Boal & Ransom remark that some researchers argue informally that the 
contrary is the case at the individual firm level. Rubery & Grimshaw (2009) are two of the 
researchers claiming this to be the case. They equalise women’s higher risk to be exposed to 
monopsony power (explained by the lack of alternative income sources and women’s limited 
job choices) with less wage elastic labour supply. They explicitly affirm that women’s labour 
supply to the individual firm is less wage elastic than that of men even if, at a more aggregate 
level it is regarded as being more elastic. Furthermore, Rubery & Grishaw (ibid) claim that it 
is arguable that women only respond to wages and adjust their labour supply in upward 
direction once women manage to enter the labour market, as they are less likely to withdraw 
from it even if wages go down. 
Sources of low reservation wages:  
A monopsonist is able to wage discriminate and press wages down to reservation wages, and 
would therefore have a preference to employ those workers with the lower reservation wages 
(according to his/ her profit maximisation behaviour). There is the claim that women have 
lower reservation wages (see e.g. Rubery, 2009). It is necessary to recognise the sources of 
low female reservation wages in order to identify ways to improve women’s wages. Low 
reservation wages can hold women’s earning opportunities down, especially in a monopsonic 
labour market. The sources of female lower reservation wages compared to male’s reservation 
wages are:  
1) Women can be regarded as newcomers into the labour market, i.e. outsiders trying to 
enter the newly established export sector. Transition from agricultural economies to 
semi-industrialised ones have created new paid job opportunities in the new industries, 
and those opportunities may be the only remunerated work opportunity for women 
who have been kept out the labour market due to among other reasons cultural norms 
(World  Bank, 2001, p187). Lindbeck and Snower  present the argument that 
newcomers, being in a vulnerable position, need to bid down their wage to encourage 
job creation and to overcome the preference that employers may have to hire insiders 
over outsiders, due to for example cost of hiring (in Rubery & Grimshaw 2009)  
 
 
2) Women’s wages may be expected to be a secondary source of income to the 
household which only contributes marginally rather than completelly proportional to 
the total family income (ibid). This male breadwinners bias assumes men to have the 
right to regularly paid jobs and jobs where there is upward mobility (Seguino & 
Grown, 2006a). The conception of men as the breadwinner in the family implicitly 
expects women to be dependent upon family income and lowers their reservation 
wages (Rubery & Grimshaw, 2009)  
 
3) Women are expected to yield lower return to human capital investments. Women 
trying to enter into the monopsonic labour market that we have described have limited 
skills, and they cannot easily move up to a higher skilled sector. The mobility from 
lower to higher skills occupations is in addition limited by the conception that women 
yields lower returns to training at work since they are more likely to leave paid work 
to fulfil domestic responsibilities, among other factors (Becker, 1993; Seguino & 
Grown, 2006a)  
We can conclude that a monopsonist would augment their profits by employing or engaging 
in transactions with workers with 1) less elastic labour supply and 2) lower reservation wages. 
The ability of incurring into these types of wage discrimination will depend on the existence 
or lack of labour market regulations (i.e. minimum wages and laws on equal pay for equal 
work). Since monopsonic labour market is an imperfect market, it is by definition in need of 
intervention if it is to yield the effective outcomes of a competitive market. It is important that 
regulations meant to protect workers’ wages are made on a global basis (or together with the 
regulation of capital) to prevent that mobile firms move to other locations in order to avoid 
local market regulations. 
In chapter 6, we will evaluate the World Bank’s and United Nations’ strategies in terms of 
their ability to improve women’s earning opportunities,  also faced with a monopsonic labour 
market. The implementation of  minimum global wages is presented as an effective way to 
limit employers monopsony power and thereby improving the earning opportunities of 





4.2 Global minimum wages/ social floor  
Warnings about the regulation of  labour markets have been made, especially regarding the 
global establishment of the International Labor Organisation’s (ILO) seven ‘core conventions’ 
(Singh & Zammit, 2004) and the inclusion of a ‘social clause’ to enforce global labour 
standards through sanctions by the WTO against countries that fail to follow such agreements 
(Kabeer, 2004)  
The core conventions are (ILO 2011):  
• Forced Labour Convention, 1930  
• Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948  
• Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949  
• Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951  
• Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, 1957  
• Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958  
• Minimum Age Convention, 1973  
• Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999 
I focus on two of the arguments against labour market regulations: (1) they affect only the 
formal sector and (2) regulations might affect hiring because they increase the costs of labour. 
The first argument is especially relevant for women since they constitute the majority of 
workers in subcontracting and home-based work. The establishment of the core ILO 
conventions or a social clause that only targets formal jobs will fail to improve the conditions 
of women working in ‘flexible’ arrangements of production. There is a need for labour 
regulations that cover people both in the formal and informal sector.  
The second argument, increased costs of labour and their effect on labour demand was revised 
in section 2.1. We came to the conclusion that in competitive markets, further increases in 
wages15 limit investments and demand of labour and thereby dampen economic growth. This 
is because labour is compensated according to productivity. The trade off between wage and 
employment growth affects women negatively, especially if, the concept of equal pay for 
equal job is replaced by policies aimed to ensure equal pay for work of equal worth (World 
Bank, 2001) as it has occurred in several places. A critique to this kind of policies is that they 
                                                 
15 For giving levels of productivity and prices of other input factors.  
 
 
require an increase in the wage levels in occupations dominated by women which will 
decrease hiring in those jobs. An increase in wage levels can also stem from other labour 
market regulations, as for example the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise which increases workers bargaining power for higher wages. Regardless of the 
source of an increase of wages in female-dominated occupations, there is a fear that such 
increases will affect women and the economy in general, as explored in this paper. However, 
we have also revised the possibility that the occupations in which women constitute the 
majority of workers (export oriented mobile industries) may be a monopsonic labour market.  
In a monopsonic labour market, it is the possible to increase wages for given levels of 
productivity without reducing the demand for labour.  
By comparing the competitive wage w* that follows from the optimisation rule in the 
competitive case:  w* = y. (see page X) with the wage stemming from the first order condition 
of the maximisation problem    𝑤𝑀 = 𝜂𝑤𝐿 (𝑤𝑀)
1+𝜂𝑤
𝐿 (𝑤𝑀)𝑦, it becomes clear that wages in a 
monopsonic labour market lie below the competitive wage.  Since 𝜂𝑤
𝐿 (𝑤𝑀)
1+𝜂𝑤
𝐿 (𝑤𝑀) < 1, it follows 
that (wM) < (w∗).  
In this case, as long as the minimum wages are lower that  (w∗) the monopsonist has an 
interest in keeping producing without reducing labour demand.  
Singh & Zammit (2004) point out that minimum wage is not included in the ILO core labour 
standards,  because it may have significant implications for the comparative advantage of low 
wages and low labour standards in developing countries. The challenge in the implementation 
of a global minimum wage is the optimal level of it, as it is imperative that it does not disturb 
differences in productivities among countries. Minimum wages meant to alleviate the pressure 
on wages stemming for other non-productive factors, for example monopsony power, will not 
disrupt the effective allocation of labour and the level of production as long as they are not set 
higher than the competitive wage (w∗ ).  
Singh & Zammit (ibid) conclude that ILO’s core conventions are too restrictive and that the 
core should be wider to include freedom from hunger, poverty and the right to decent living. 
This is in line with the goal of human development to which the international community has 
committed to itself. Kabeer (2004) suggests the implementation of a universal social floor that 
protects the basic needs of all citizens, independently of the characteristics of their working 
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arrangements (e.g. formal or informal).  A ‘social clause’ enforced by the World Trade 
Organisation will only serve the needs of a minority, she concludes. Kabeer’s notion of social 
floor is not conceptually different from a minimum wage that successfully reflects the 
differences in productivities among countries and people. 
The creation and implementation of a non-disruptive global minimum wage law is an 
ambitious project in which international politics will play a major role. One crucial point is to 
determine which international organisation is going to enforce such a regulation and whether 
or not the governments should be held responsible if international firms fail to comply with 
the law.16 These questions are beyond the scope of this thesis even if they are decisive for 
economic mechanism to function. However, the importance of the analysis relies on the 
recognition of such mechanisms.  
4.3 Preferred workers  
Women participate more in the labour market today that before (United Nations, 1995; World 
Bank, 2001; Tzannatos,1999), gender wage gaps appear to be narrowing overall (World Bank 
2001), and the new export-sector industries seem to be more gender-blind than the few, non-
competitive industries in domestic markets. All this empirical evidence gives a promising 
impression of a reduction in discriminating attitudes towards women on the basis of sex.  
There are, however, claims of a newer form of ‘discrimination’ of women. The signatories 
stated it in the following way in the Beijing Declaration (United Nations, 1995:65): 
‘In many regions, women’s participation in remunerated work in the formal and non-
formal labour market has increased significantly and has changed during the past decade. 
(…). Due to, inter alia, difficult economic situations and a lack of bargaining power resulting 
from gender inequality, many women have been forced to accept low pay and poor working 
conditions and thus have often become preferred workers.’ 
It is challenging to understand these claims in terms of discrimination, because female 
workers are not being denied entrance to the labour market. Women are predominantly 
getting the jobs in the new industries. In Bangladesh for example, the export oriented garment 
manufacturing in the early 1980s created the first generation of female factory workers 
(Becker, 1993). It is, however, the disadvantaged position of women in labour markets which 
                                                 
16 Proponents of the implementation of the social clause want the state to be responsible  
 
 
is becoming their ‘comparative advantage’. Findings elsewhere than Bangladesh corroborated 
this new ‘comparative advantage of women’ (Kabeer, 2004).  
The disadvantaged position of women is a result of lack of economic alternatives that can 
create monopsonic labour markets, allowing firms to remunerate workers according to non-
productivity factors such as the elasticity of labour supply and reservation wages. In addition 
to the lack of economic alternatives, there are social arrangements that influence women’s 
reservation wages, as those we distinguished above. Furthermore, there still exist some less 
‘sophisticated’17 disadvantages of women, which, are described by one woman working at a 
garment factory in Bangladesh:  
‘ You see, as women, one of our wings is broken. We don’t have the nerve that a man 
has, because we know we have a broken wing. A man can sleep anywhere, he can just lie 
down on the street and go to sleep. A woman cannot do that. She has to thin about her body, 
about her security. So the garment factory owner prefers to hire women because men are 
smarter about their opportunities, you train them and they move on. Even when he compares 
a small boy and an older girl, he will think, “she’s only a girl, she can’t wander too far away’ 
(Kabeer 2004).  
The predominance of women in the mobile industries characterised by low skill levels and 
low wages (resulting partly from non-productive factors) contribute to keep women in 
poverty. As we saw above, the low wages observed in these industries and the ability of firms 
to move to other locations in response to regulations aimed at eroding monopsony power, 
reduce the firms incentives for investment in human capital of female workers. In that way, 
women’s disadvantaged position and the low wages that follow from it could prevent 
economic growth. Empowering these women, by balancing the power relations between 
female (as well as male) workers and firms, would promote economic growth by increasing 
the human capital of the country and not just maintaining unproductive jobs that hold female 
workers in what Seguino calls a ‘low skills –low-productivity trap’. This would again 
reconcile the goals of empowering of women and economic growth. 
                                                 
17 They are less sophisticated because while an uneven distribution unpaid work burden is still an issue in 
otherwise more gender equal societies as the Norwegian and women’s lower reservation wages is still a 
relevant discussion regarding minimum wages in OECD countries (Rubery & G 2009), the discussion on whether 
women are less smart than men seems rather primitive. 
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5 The United Nations and World Bank’s strategies 
for the empowerment of women. 
The motivation to understand the constraints that limit women’s earning opportunities is to 
find ways to relax this constraints. The second research question of this paper is concerned 
with determining if the United Nations and the World Bank’s strategies can overcome such 
constraints. An important clarification is needed. The international organisations mentioned in 
the introduction have committed themselves to the goal of empowerment of women. They 
have developed strategies that aim for the empowerment of women in a broader 
understanding of the concept that the one used in this paper. My paper concentrates on the 
empowerment of women in terms of the improvement of their earning opportunities.  
In this chapter, I respond to three sub-questions needed to clarify whether the organisations’ 
strategies for empowerment of women can overcome the constraints that limit women’s 
earning opportunities. When establishing the ability of the organisations’ strategies to 
overcome the constraints on women’s earning opportunities, we need first to make sure that 
their conceptualisation of women’s empowerment includes the aspect we are here concerned 
with, namely the improvement of women’s earning opportunities.  
The first question is whether, by committing to the goal of the empowerment of women, the 
international organisations are aiming for the improving women’s earning opportunities.  The 
remaining two questions emerge from the potential conflict between improved earning 
opportunities and economic growth. In the previous chapters of this paper, we have 
considered this conflict as a potential constraint on earning opportunities based on the 
assumption that economic growth could be prioritised over improved earning opportunities. 
The second question is if the organisations are sufficiently aware of the potential conflict 
between improved earning opportunities for women and economic growth. Finally, the third 
question we need to answer is whether or not the organisations have any criteria by which 
they decide whether to prioritise the improvement of earning opportunities or economic 
growth in the case of a conflict. The answer to these questions, thereby providing a 
background to answering the second research question, builds on the analysis of three 
strategic papers from the UN General Assembly and the World Bank. I shall start by 




5.1 The strategic papers 
In total, three documents were revised. From the UN General Assembly we consider the 
Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action annexed to it (United Nations, 1995). This 
Declaration was adopted in 1995 at the Fourth World Conference on Women. From the 
World Bank, two strategic papers are reviewed: ‘Integrating Gender into the World Bank's 
Work: A strategy for Action’ (World Bank, 2002) and ‘A World Bank Group Action Plan: 
Gender Equality as Smart Economics’ (World Bank, 2006).18 
The Beijing Declaration and the platform of action annexed to it has a justified place in this 
review because The Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which the Beijing 
Declaration is the major result of, is extensively regarded as the point of reference for the 
international efforts on gender equality and the empowerment of  women (UN DESA, 2007). 
According to the World Bank, the Bank’s attention to gender equality dates back to the 
1970’s. The documents included in this review are the two major strategic papers that the 
Bank has formulated (World Bank, 2011).  
The Beijing Declaration is the widest of all documents in scope and the recommendations 
made include actions to be carried out by governments, international organisations and civil 
society. The World Bank’s documents are of an internal character. In their strategy paper 
from 2002, the Bank aims to establish a strategy to integrate gender-responsive actions into its 
assistance work. The paper does not spell out concrete actions to be carried out by the Bank, 
governments, civil society or other donors in its client countries. It is rather an overall strategy 
that will, through cooperation among the parties, ‘diagnose gender-related barriers to and 
opportunities for poverty reduction and sustainable development; and will then identify and 
support appropriate actions to reduce these barriers and capitalise on the opportunities’ 
(World Bank, 2002: XII). The main contribution of the strategic paper to this review is the 
concise presentation it makes of the empirical links between gender equality and economic 
growth, what they call the ‘business case for mainstreaming gender’. The Action Plan from 
2006 seeks to ‘advance women’s economic empowerment in the World Bank Group’s client 
countries’ (World Bank, 2006:1). In this strategic plan, the Bank provides some valuable 
                                                 
18 This strategic paper was published in 2002, but the strategy was endorsed by Board of Executive Directors on 




examples of interventions in key markets that would improve the economic empowerment of 
women in terms of ‘making markets work for women’ and ‘empowering women to compete 
in the market’ (ibid., p. 4). 
5.2 Empowerment of women & earning 
opportunities 
By committing to the goal of empowering women, are the international organisations aiming 
for improving women’s earning opportunities? 
We are interested in answering this question because it could be the case that the 
organisations’ understanding of empowerment of women excludes the improvement of 
women’s earning opportunities. It they organisations do not consider the improvement of 
earning opportunities as a component of women’s empowerment then our evaluation of the 
strategies would be incorrect. This is, of course, because we would be assessing the strategies 
in terms of a goal they never intended to achieve. 
Based on the strategic papers at hand, we can conclude that the organisations consider the 
improvement of earning opportunities as an important component of the empowerment of 
women. In the Beijing Declaration, there is an explicit demand for higher wages and the 
improvement of working conditions for low-skilled workers. The World Bank focuses on 
creating opportunities for women so that they can earn an income. The Bank does not 
explicitly advocate for higher wages for female workers, but it limits its focus to factors that 
increase workers’ productivity (e.g. health and education). The Bank also puts emphasis on 
the need to alleviate domestic duties and unpaid work for women and by that liberating 
working hours that women can use to generate income. The Bank seems to assume that 
increases in productivity will lead to better income. In chapter 3, we saw that this is not 
necessarily true in the case where the distribution of power between employers and suppliers 





5.3 Empowerment of women & economic growth  
The second question is if the organisations are aware of the potential conflict between 
improved earning opportunities for women and economic growth. We have seen that the 
organisations include the improvement of earning opportunities in their concept of 
empowerment of women. In this section, I summarise the economic mechanisms I have 
identified in the strategic papers and which, according to the organisations, link empowerment 
of women and economic growth. By looking at how the organisations consider the 
relationship between empowerment of women and economic growth, we seek to discover 
whether or not the organisations recognise the potential conflict between improved earning 
opportunities and economic growth. It is important to determinate if the organisations 
explicitly recognise this potential conflict because in the positive case, it is relevant to 
compare their analysis of this conflict with ours. It will furthermore be interesting to evaluate 
their solutions to such potential conflicts, if solutions are stated. 
I will concentrate on the direct economic links between the empowerment of women and 
economic growth and ignore the correlation that might exist between women’s empowerment 
and other pro-growth conditions such as good governance.  
The first thing to notice in these strategic papers is that both organisations refer to the 
empowerment of women as having a positive impact on the economy. The UNDP states that 
‘gender equality also makes good economic sense’ (UNDP, 2011a) while the World Bank 
asserts that ‘the empowerment of women is smart economics’ (World Bank, 2006).  
The Beijing declaration 
The recommendations for action expressed in the Beijing Declaration and Platform can be 
divided into three categories; 1) measures aimed to promote the mainstreaming of the gender 
perspective, 2) highlighting the importance of and need for further research of gender issues, 
and 3) actions that facilitate the full participation of women in all spheres of society and 
access to productive resources, opportunities and public services.  
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I focus on the third category of actions and more specifically the recommendations aimed at 
enhancing women’s participation in economic life and access to productive resources.19 I 
revised all the paragraphs of the Platform of Action annexed to the Beijing Declaration and 
recognised four areas that the Declaration seeks to influence in order to promote the economic 
opportunities of women: 
• Health  
• Education and training 
• Institutions  
• Social arrangement and norms that constrain women’s participation (e.g. recognition 
of the productive character of unpaid work as for example childbearing and 
housework)  
The World Bank   
In the business case strategic paper ‘Integrating Gender into the World Bank's Work: A 
Strategy for Action’, the Bank revises the empirical links of gender equality to growth and 
concludes:  
‘The primary pathways through which gender systems affect growth are the 
productivity of labour and the allocative efficiency of the economy, specifically 
through: 
1) Investments in human capital (especially girls’ and women’s education and health); 
2) Investments in physical capital (especially women’s access to capital or to the 
formal sector employment it creates); and 
3) The functioning of markets and institutions.’ 
 
                                                 
19 A few examples of Paragraphs regarding women’s participation in economic life and access to productive 
resources: 26, 27 and 35 in the Beijing Declaration. The following paragraphs are to be found in the platform of 
action annexed to the Declaration: 21 (about remunerate and unremunerated work at home). 51 (about 
institutional constrains to economic participation), 55 (on the productivity capacity of woman) and 165(j) (on 
the policies regarding savings, credit and lending mechanism for women).  
 
 
The effects of investments in human and physical capital on productivity mentioned by the 
World Bank are well known in economic growth theory. The early Solow (1956 in Ehrlich & 
Murphy, 2007) model of economic growth treated labour and physical capital as reproducible 
factors of production. The model focused mainly in the contribution of these factors to 
growth. Early applications of this model attributed the large unexplained residual observed to 
improvements in technology. With the eventual conceptualisation of human capital, 
researchers were able to explain a larger share of the determinants of growth 
(Ehrlich&Murphy, 2007). The improvements on growth theory changed the assumption that 
labour was static and that it was not possible to augment it (Becker, 1993). Medical care, 
education and training are some ways to improve the human capital of workers. Ehrlich and 
Murphy point out that the ‘human capital revolution’ has move the attention away from 
focusing solely on physical capital investments and placed people at the centre of the 
economy (2007).  
The Bank highlights the results of Tzannatos (1999). In that paper, Tzannatos evaluates the 
inefficiencies stemming from persistent gender differential in the labour market. He concludes 
that the improvement in women’s labour market outcomes and less segregated labour force (a 
distinctive feature of the labour market) can increase output and welfare of women and men. 
In this way, reallocation of workers across occupations will enhance growth. 
The economy will also be more efficient when markets and institutions function adequately. 
Institutions can promote women access to productive assets such as land or credit. The well 
functioning of markets will, as economic theory suggest, produce higher levels of output. The 
Bank gives the example of labour laws, allegedly created in order to protect women, and 
points out that such laws can result in rigidities in the allocation of labour and create 
inefficiencies. The rationale behind economic theory is that competitive markets will yield 
efficient outcomes. An example  not given by the World Bank is the case of imperfect 
markets, where regulation is needed to correct for such imperfections. In chapter five, a model 
of an imperfect labour market is presented. In that case, regulation will be what could bring 
the market closer to the competitive case.  
Summarising, after revising the organisations’ strategic papers, I arrived at the conclusion that 
the ways the UN and the World Bank connect empowerment of women to economic growth 
are quite similar. The well-known argument that investment in human capital yields gains in 
economic performance was supplemented by four other channels through which the 
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empowerment of women is expected to encourage economic growth. Of the total five, just 
three of the links that have been recognised can be said to be gender-specific. The first two 
links listed below are equally applicable for the empowerment of men, if he was deprived of 
education, health or with limited access to productive assets as, for example, his own time, 
land, credit opportunities etc. The emphasis the organisation put in women, is that there are 
women who traditionally have less access to education, health, etc.  
The channels through which, according to the organisations, women’s empowerment benefits 
economic growth are: 
• by increasing the human capital stock of a country;  
• by increasing of size of the labour force; 
• by increasing the human capital of the next generation, as women improve their 
traditional tasks as caregivers and motherhood; 
• by improving savings and consumption choices, as there are gender differences in the 
use of income and capital; 
• by improved usage of natural resources, as women and especially indigenous women 
possess gender-specific knowledge regarding the use and management of natural 
resources. This is an argument find in the Beijing Declaration, but not in the Business 
Case from the World Bank.  
None of the papers analyse the potential contradiction between higher wages and output 
created by the mobility of firms. The UN declaration in several passages denounces that 
wages are kept down by the asymmetries of power between employers and suppliers of 
labour. The World Bank does not write about it.  When evaluating the strategic papers, we 
will not necessarily expect them to include a strategy that includes the regulation of capital 
movements (as proposed in chapter 3) or the implementation of a global minimum wage (as 





5.4 Empowering of women or economic growth 
The last question I posed at the beginning of this chapter was: Do the organisations have any 
criteria by which they decide whether to prioritise the improvement of earning opportunities 
or economic growth? This question is relevant because the potential conflict between earning 
opportunities and economic growth could limit the earning opportunities of women if 
economic growth was to be prioritised.  
The organisations appear to differ in the way they justify the goal of the empowerment of 
women and the priority they give to it in relation to the goal of economic growth. Consider 
the following statements:  
From the Beijing Declaration (1995:7): 
‘[...] Equality between and women and men is a matter of human rights and a 
condition for social justice and is also a necessary and fundamental prerequisite for equality, 
development and peace [...]’, 
From the World Bank’s Strategy for Action paper (World Bank, 2002:1)  
‘Gender equality is an issue of development effectiveness, not just a matter of political 
correctness of kindness to women. [...] The need for a new strategy arises both from the 
evidence that gender plays an important role in determining economic growth, poverty 
reduction, and development effectiveness, and from the less-than-systematic integration of 
gender concerns into the Bank’s work to date’.  
They statements can be compatible, but they do not necessarily have to. The apparent 
differences in the argumentation for the empowerment of women ( i.e. gender equality) 
between the organisations can be seen as differences in the way they value the goal of gender 
equality and its priority in relation to the goal of economic growth. Goals in general can be 
understood as having an intrinsic value, or an instrumental value – goals to be achieved as a 
means to fulfilling superior goals.  
The statement from the World Bank seems to be following a rationality of the second type; 
gender equality in order to achieve economic growth.  The United Nations approaches it from 
the human rights and social justice perspective. It can be discussed whether there is any 
ranking among the goals mentioned in the first statement or not, but economic growth is not 
mention and, because of its absence, we could imply that it is not considered a superior goal 
than the ones explicitly mentioned in the statement. One might argue that the concept of 
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economic growth is equivalent to the concept of development in the first statement, and 
thereby, argue that gender equality is a prerequisite to economic growth (because it is said to 
be a prerequisite for development). However, the UN through its Development Program has 
coined, since 1990 (UNDP, 1990), the concept of ‘Human Development’. The concept is 
summarised to be ‘a development paradigm that is about much more than the rise or fall of 
national incomes, [...] it is thus about much more than economic growth, which is only a 
means —if a very important one —of enlarging people’s choices’(UNDP, 2011b). A last 
case: if both gender equality and economic growth are prerequisites for development, then we 
cannot establish whether gender equality is more important for development than economic 
growth or vice-versa. We can conclude that for the United Nations, the goal of gender 
equality does not earn its value (and justification) from being a way to achieve economic 
growth. Yet it is not clear whether the Beijing Declaration considers gender equality as goal 
with purely intrinsic value. Gender equality is therefore not of a lower rank in importance 
than economic growth according to the Beijing Declaration.  
Stephanie Seguino (2006b) revises the one report from which the strategic paper from 2002 
gets the conclusion that ‘gender inequality retards economic growth and poverty reduction’20 
(World Bank, 2002:6) and compares the approach in it with that of the Beijing Declaration. 
Seguino highlights the differences between them and claims that the efficiency argument used 
by the World Bank is needed to assure that the papers are consistent with the economic 
principles, different to the human rights principles, that govern the Bank’s operations. She 
goes further and explains that the efficiency arguments have been designed to ‘win over the 
neoclassical macroeconomists at the Bank who have been unwilling or uninterested in 
considering the role of gender’ (Seguino, 2006b:10). 
An alternative way to explain the different approaches to gender equality is to consider the 
dimension of human development on which each of the organisations function. While the UN 
is pursuing Human Development, the World Bank ‘focuses on achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) that call for the elimination of poverty and sustained21 
development' (World Bank, 2011).22 The focus of the World Bank is narrower than that of the 
UN as poverty elimination is just one of the eight MDG. The World Bank’s mandate to 
                                                 
20 Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice 
21 Sustainable development refers to development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The concept encompasses both environmental and 
economic sustainability. 
22 Italics added 
 
 
promote sustained development does not necessarily imply the broader concept of human 
development. With this in mind, it is easy to understand that, due to the scope of their 
activities, the Bank’s immediate concern is economic growth. There should not be any 
confusion on what the role of each of the organisations is. The World Bank is one of the 
specialised agencies of the United Nations, and as such, the Bank explicitly recognises the 
commitments that their member states made at the Fourth World Conference, at which the 
Beijing Declaration was adopted, and at the United Nation Millennium Summit which main 
commitments are summarised by the eight MDGs (World Bank, 2002; UN DESA, 2007). 
Being this is the case, the World Bank and its members, being already committed to the 
Beijing Declaration and the MDGs, cannot reduce the goal of gender equality to an 
instrument for achieving economic growth.  
The discussion of the instrumental vs. intrinsic value of goals would be less relevant if there 
never was a contradiction of goals and both could be realised simultaneously. This is because 
people or governments would not have to rank them in order to prioritise the one over the 
other. 
The concluding point here is that, even as the World Bank internally needs the efficiency 
argument to be interested in gender equality, the World Bank’s member states cannot easily 
decide which goal to prioritise. The decision should be based on which of the goals will lead 
to the higher goal of Human Development.  
Throughout this paper, we have been looking at the special case where an attempt to alleviate 
women’s conditions by increasing their wages levels will jeopardise economic growth.  In 
that situation, the way in which the international organisations and governments give value to 
and prioritise the goals of gender equality will be of high relevance for the decision being 
made and the outcomes that follow.  
The short discussion on the rank order of goals showed that the organisations do not have a 
well defined criterion to determine which goal, economic growth or gender equality, should 
be the first concern of a decision-maker. In the lack of such a rule to follow when facing a 
difficult choice, the best the organisations can aim for is to avoid the contradiction of goals.  
In this paper, I concentrate on identifying the mechanism that creates the conflict. It is 
assumed that a decision-maker will gain from identifying this source of conflict if it helps 
him/her to overcome it and harmonise both goals. 
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6 The organisations recommendations 
In this chapter, I, once again review the strategic papers revised in chapter 5 in order to 
examine whether or not the organisations include recommendations aimed at correcting for 
other factors than productivity which press female wages down. In chapters 3and 4, we came 
to the conclusion that the mobility of firms and the lack of alternative economic opportunities 
for women and men may pressure wages down in the export oriented, labour intensive 
industry. In that context, we identified that while differences in power between firms and 
workers affect both women and men, women would receive the lowest wages because of their 
lower reservation wages. We highlighted three sources of low female reservation wages: 1) 
Women’s character as outsiders to the labour market, implying that in the absence of a 
minimum wage they may want to bid down their wage in order to enter the newly established 
market; 2) the conception of women’s wage as a secondary source of income to the 
household; and 3) women are expected to yield lower returns to human capital investment 
because of their family duties and unpaid work.  
In chapter 3 and 4, we identified two concrete theoretical possibilities for relaxing the 
constraints on wages stemming from non-productive factors: the asymmetric power between 
firms and workers and women’s lower reservation wages. These theoretical possibilities were 
a global minimum wage that does not disturb the comparative advantage among countries 
and/or global regulations of capital mobility.  
As mentioned in chapter 5, two main strategic papers for the World Bank were revised: 
‘Integrating Gender into the World Bank's Work: A Strategy for Action’ published in 2002 
and ‘A World Bank Group Action Plan: Gender Equality as Smart Economics’ from 2006. 
The strategy of the first strategic document focuses on enhancing country-led, country 
specific strategies for removing gender patterns that prevent growth, poverty reduction and 
human well-being. The World Bank emphasises the constraints to growth and human well-
being at the country level, but it misses the global dimension of the empowerment of women. 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, globalisation defines the characteristics of women’s 
working conditions in developing countries in early stages of industrialisation. In this case, it 
is necessary to consider strategies for empowerment of women in this context. The World 
Bank’s ‘Integrating Gender into the World Bank's Work: A Strategy for Action’ paper does 
not cover this dimension.  
 
 
The more recent strategic paper, ‘A World Bank Group Action Plan: Gender Equality as 
Smart Economics’ from 2006, emphasises the World Bank’s trust in market mechanisms, and 
expresses its commitment to ‘making markets work for women’ and ‘empowering women to 
compete in markets’. If it is the case that the labour market of low-skilled labour in 
developing countries presents monopsonic features and an asymmetric bargaining power 
keeping women in poverty on other grounds than their level of skills, then there is a case for 
intervention in order to make the markets work for women. In this strategic paper, the Bank 
presents some valuable examples of interventions in key markets such as the labour market. 
The World Bank does not consider global regulation of capital movements or the 
establishment of a minimum wages as a measure to be taken for empowering women.  
In the Beijing Declaration, the participating Heads of State recommended actions to be taken 
by governments, civil society and international organisations. The Beijing Declaration 
explicitly recognises that adverse economic environment affect the working security of 
workers negatively, especially for women. ‘Women often have no choice but to take on 
employment in (…) unprotected home-base production’ (United Nations, 1995:10). In 
addition, the Declaration states that women enter the labour market in what they call under—
remunerated jobs. This narrative can be explained in terms of our basic model of monopsonic 
labour markets, and in terms of differences of bargaining power between workers and firms.  
The Beijing Declaration does not link the precarious situation of some female workers in 
developing countries to the liberalisation of capital, which allows for flows of foreign direct 
investment into low sunk cost industries and the powerful position it provides to mobile firms. 
The Declaration encourages the adoption of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
conventions on labour rights. As we saw in chapter 4, the core conventions on labour rights 
will improve the working conditions in the formal sector, but they are not enough for what is 
needed to protect work in more ‘flexible’ forms of production as home-based subcontract 
arrangements. The recommendations made by the Beijing Declaration are mostly directed 
towards governments. In that sense, the Beijing Declaration also lacks recommendations that 




7 Conclusion  
In chapter 2, a set of conditions that may create a conflict between the empowerment of 
women and output was presented. Out of this specific context, women’s empowerment was 
operationalised as an increment in wage levels in foreign mobile firms. Distinctive features of 
mobile firms are that they are engaged in the production of export-oriented goods, and that 
these firms have low sunk costs because the production process is labour-intensive and 
requires low levels of skills. It is the low sunk costs that allow firms to move their operations 
to other locations. This is especially harmful for developing countries in early stages of 
industrialisation as they depend on foreign capital in order to produce. Furthermore, Chapter 2 
also contains the presentation of a short-run, structuralist model by Seguino and Blecker 
(2002) that formalises the case of a trade off between higher wages and output. Of special 
interest in that section is the identification of an ‘optimistic’ scenario, in which the conflict 
between higher wages and economic growth is overcome. In chapter 3, the ability of firms to 
leave a location is identified to be the most influential parameter in order to produce the 
optimistic scenario described in chapter 3. We therefore concluded that global regulation of 
foreign direct investment movements will empower women and increase their bargaining 
power against firms. Chapter 4 analyses how the lack of alternative economic opportunities 
for women and men can pressure wages in the mobile industry down. In that section, the 
possibility that low wage levels depend on other factors than productivity becomes clear. 
While differences in power between firms and workers affect both women and men, women 
are affected the most because of their lower reservation wages. The implementation of a 
global minimum wage that does not disturb the comparative advantage will reduce the power 
differential between a monopsonist and suppliers of labour. A global minimum wage will 
bring wages closer to competitive wages that reflect the productivity of workers.  Chapter 5 
sets the grounds for our evaluation of the organisations’ strategies in terms of their ability to 
improve women’s earning possibilities. Finally, chapter 6 revises whether the strategic paper 
includes recommendations aimed at balancing the power differences between firms and 
workers and alleviating the gender-specific reasons for women to have lower reservation 
wages than men. I conclude that both the Beijing Declaration and the strategic papers from 
the World Bank fail to address the constraints that limit women’s earnings opportunities 
stemming from the mobility of capital across borders and the monopsony power that the firms 
 
 
may possess in the labour markets in developing countries. The organisations miss the global 
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